Paul F. Walden v. S.M.P. Trucking and/or Royal insurance and The Employers\u27 Reinsurance Fund: Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Paul F. Walden v. S.M.P. Trucking and/or Royal
insurance and The Employers' Reinsurance Fund:
Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Erie V. Boorman; Administrator Employers' Reinsurance Fund; Attorney for Appellees.
Rnady M. Lish: Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Walden v. S.M.P. Trucking, No. 890282 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1861
*-*jS J 
./%0 
BUCKET i\0, ,T OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL F. WALDEN. 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
S.M.P. TRUCKING and/or ROYAL 
INSURANCE and THE EMPLOYERS' 
REINSURANCE FUND. 
Defendants. 
Case No. 890282-CA 
Classification No. 6 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND 
Randy M. Lish 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
930 South State. Suite 10 
Orem. Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
Erie V. Boorman. Administrator 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801) 530-6820 
F I L E D 
0CT1O1989 
Clark of *M*Couri 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL F. WALDEN. 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
S.M.P. TRUCKING and/or ROYAL 
INSURANCE and THE EMPLOYERS' 
REINSURANCE FUND. 
Defendants. 
Case No. 890282-CA 
Classification No. 6 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT EMPLOYERS1 REINSURANCE FUND 
Randy M. Lish 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
930 South State. Suite 10 
Orem. Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
Erie V. Boorman. Administrator 
Employers1 Reinsurance Fund 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801) 530-6820 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
I. JURISDICTION 1 
II. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 1 
IV. DETERMINATIVE LAW 2 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
VII. ARGUMENT . 6 
Point I 6 
Point II 8 
VIII CONCLUSION 13 
Exhibit I. 
Large v. Industrial Commission. 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988) 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Statutory Provisions 
Utah Code Annotated. Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) 
Utah Code Annotated. Section 35-1-82.51 
Utah Code Annotated. Section 35-1-82.53 
Industrial Commission. Industrial Accident Rules 
Rule No. R490-1-4 
Cases 
Entwistle Co. v. Wilkins. 626 P.2d. 495. 498 (Utah 1981) . 
Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheeting Co.. 717 P.2d. 718 
(Utah 1986) 
Large v. Industrial Commission. 758 P.2d. 954 
(Utah App. 1988) 2. 
Oman v. Industrial Commission. 735 P.2d. 665 
(Utah App. 1987) 
Retherford v. Industrial Commission. 739 P.2d. 76 
(Utah App. 1987) 
Wickham v. Industrial Commission. 
Order of Dismissal. Case No. 870200-CA 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL F. WALDEN. 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
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REINSURANCE FUND. 
Defendants. 
Case No. 890282-CA 
Classification No. 6 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT EMPLOYERS1 REINSURANCE FUND 
I. JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
U.C.A. Section 78-2a-3 (2) (a). 
II. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This action is an appeal from a decision rendered by the 
Industrial Commission of the State of Utah on April 18. 1989. 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
(1) Whether the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund's Motion for 
Review was timely filed? 
(2) Whether there is evidence in the record to support 
the Commission's Findings and Order that plaintiff's permanent total 
disability rate must be based on the rate applicable on the date of 
plaintiff's 1976 injury on which plaintiff was rendered permanently 
and totally disabled. 
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On August 25, 1976, plaintiff's forklift overturned, 
resulting in severe left ankle fracture requiring perhaps as many as 
13 surgeries and ultimately resulting in a rating of 85% permanent 
partial impairment of the left foot at the ankle for which payment 
was ordered by the Industrial Commission on 2/8/81 (R.46, 47). 
Following numerous other medical referrals, including treatment for 
severe depression and suicide ruminations (R.49), and the 
termination of compensation payments from the August 25, 1976 ankle 
fracture injury, plaintiff applied for permanent total disability 
benefits from the Second Injury Fund (now called Employers1 
Reinsurance Fund), A letter dated November 10, 1981 by plaintiff's 
orthopedic treating Surgeon, John P. Mendenhall, contained the 
following diagnoses: (R.53) 
(1) Fused left wrist; (2) osteoarthritis right wrist with 
ununited fractured scaphoid and spontaneous inner carpal 
fusions; (3) status post operative fusion L-4 to the 
sacrum with severe osteoarthritis; (4) early 
osteoarthritis left hip; (5) status post operative 
arthrodesis left ankle with incomplete fusion. 
And further: Mr. Walden is totally disabled due to the 
above listed orthopedic problems. 
Following the receipt of the above medical report, the 
Industrial Commission, through Joseph C. Foley, Admininistrative Law 
Judge, on November 25, 1981, placed plaintiff on the permanent and 
total disability payroll of the Second Injury Fund effective May 29, 
1981. Plaintiff has been receiving permanent total disability 
benefits since that date. 
Even after the above determination, the record shows 
additional ankle fusion as of April 17, 1985 on plaintiff's left 
side indicating that "he has had 38 surgical procedures" with 
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respect to that ankle injury. (R.84) Also of interest and 
pertinent to plaintiff's pre-existing overall disability, the record 
shows a slip and fall injury in May, 1984 while at a K-Mart Store, 
which resulted in right knee surgery in October 1984 (R.74). and 
also a personal injury law suit by plaintiff against the K-Mart 
Store. 
Alleged industrial injury of September 17, 1985. 
Notwithstanding all of the regognized severe and disabling 
conditions above referred to, plaintiff, in August, 1985, secured a 
truck driving job and had been working only 26 days when the 
industrial incident giving rise to this controversy occurred. On 
September 17, 1985, the record shows (R.386) that plaintiff was 
tightening a boom on a trailer when his right hand slipped and he 
struck his wrist on the edge of the trailer. When the wrist pain 
did not respond to initial treatment, plaintiff on November 27. 1985 
underwent a successful total wrist arthroplasty (R.96-98). The 
preoperative diagnosis was listed (R.96) as "severe degenerative 
osteoarthritis of the wrist". This diagnosis was repeated later 
when plaintiff's right wrist was fused (R.107). 
Of additional medical interest and significance is a To 
Whom It May Concern letter written by plaintiff's orthopedic 
Surgeon, Devon A. Nelson, on August 11, 1986 (R.105). stating "I 
don't think that the patient's status has improved since the 1981 
evaluation done by Dr. Mendenhall. In fact, if any, he has 
deteriorated, he continues to be completely disabled due to the 
above problems." On November 21, 1988, Gilbert Martinez, 
Administrative Law Judge issued Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law 
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and Order allowing plaintiff's permanent total disability claim 
attributable to September 17. 1985 industrial incident but 
permitting the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to offset temporary total 
disability payments made by the carrier to plaintiff at the same 
time the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund was continuing payments to 
plaintiff pursuant to plaintiff's permanent total disability award 
resulting from his 1976 industrial injury. Both plaintiff and 
defendant Employers' Reinsurance Fund filed with the Industrial 
Commission Motions for Review of the Findings and Order made by the 
Administrative Law Judge. Plaintiff objected to the offset of 
temporary total disability payments and defendant objected to the 
granting of new permanent total disability benefits arising out of 
the September 17. 1985 industrial incident. 
The full Commission reviewed the entire file including the 
entire medical files on plaintiff, and on April 18, 1989 issued its 
unanimous Order granting both Motions for Review. In other words, 
the Commission reinstated plaintiff's earlier permanent total 
disability award based upon the 1976 industrial injury and at the 
same time disallowed any offset for temporary total disability 
payments received by plaintiff as a result of his September 17. 1985 
injury. 
Plaintiff on May 10. 1989 filed with this Court his 
Petition of Appeal. 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
(1) Defendant's Motion for Review was timely filed and in 
compliance with the Industrial Commission. Industrial Accident 
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Rule R490-1-4. pertaining to the filing of responses to notices or 
Orders issued or otherwise served by mail. 
(2) There is substantial evidence in the record to 
support the Commission's factual determination that plaintiff's 
permanent total disability was caused by his pre-existing injuries 
and other conditions and not by the alleged injury of September 17. 
1985. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR REVIEW WAS TIMELY FILED. 
Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, there is no statute 
governing the filing of defendant's Motion for Review with the 
Industrial Commission in this case. The former Statute. Section 
35-1-82.51 U.C.A., was repealed effective January 1. 1988. This 
left in its stead Section 35-1-82.53 as amended effective April 25. 
1988. to read as follows: 
35-1-82.53. Review of Administrative's Order - finality 
of Commission's Order. 
(1) Any party and interest who is dissatisfied with the 
Order entered by an Administrative Law Judge may seek 
review of that Order with the Commission by complying with 
the Commission's rules governing that review. 
(2) The Order of the Commission on review is final unless 
set a side by the Court of Appeals. 
Thus, the Industrial Commission is permitted to establish 
its own rules for the filing of a Motion Seeking Review of an Order 
entered by an Administrative Law Judge. In this case, the Order of 
November 21, 1988. contains the following: 
It is further Ordered that any Motions for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within 30 days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail, the particular errors 
and objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be 
final and not subject to review or appeal. 
(R.530) That Order with its Certificate of Mailing 
(R.531) was mailed to all the parties including the Employers1 
Reinsurance Fund on November 21, 1988 by the Industrial Commission. 
The Industrial Commission Allowance for Mailing under such 
circumstances is set forth in its Rule #R490-l-4 - Allowance for 
Mailing - which read as follows: 
Whenever a notice or other paper requiring or permitting 
some action on behalf of a party is served on a party by 
mail, three (3) days shall be added to the prescribed 
contained in these Rules or in the Workers* Compensation 
Act. 
The Industrial Commission found that the filing by this 
defendant of its Motion for Review was within the specified thirty 
(30) days plus three (3) days allowance and, therefore, held that 
the Motion was timely filed. Reference to the Rule will make it 
clear that it matters not what method of filing (by mail or 
hand-delivery) is used by the person or party filing the Motion to 
Review of the Order it has received from the Administrative Law 
Judge. It would not make sense for the Commission to disallow 
hand-delivery within the three (3) days period but permit a party to 
file even a day after the hand-delivery so long as the response 
reaches the Commission within the required thirty (30) days plus the 
three (3) days allowance time. 
The Retherford and Wickham cases referred to by plaintiff 
deal with review by the Court of Appeals of Final Orders of the 
Industrial Commission rather than review by the Industrial 
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Commission of an Order of the Administrative Law Judge which review 
by Statute is governed by the Rules of the Industrial Commission. 
In addition, both of those cases arose prior to the repeal of the 
Statutes referred to above which prescribed specific time limits 
within which review by the Commission must be sought. Instead, as 
mentioned above, responsibility for setting the appropriate 
procedures and time limits for the filing of Motion for Review now 
is delegated to the Commission and, in this case, subject to the 
application of Commission Rule #R490-l-4. 
In summary. the Commission through the Statute above 
referred to has jurisdiction to determine the appropriate dates for 
filing in this case and its finding that defendant's Motions for 
Review was timely is supported by the Statute and by the 
Commission's rule with respect to such filing. 
POINT II 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE 
COMMISSION'S FACTUAL DETERMINATION THAT PLAINTIFF'S 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY WAS CAUSED BY HIS PRE-EXISTING 
INJURIES AND OTHER CONDITIONS AND NOT BY THE ALLEGED 
INJURY OF SEPTEMBER 17, 1985. 
The Industrial Commission found that plaintiff's alleged 
industrial injury of September 17, 1985, did not cause or result in 
his permanent total disability because plaintiff already was 
permanently and totally disabled due to the pre-existing injuries 
and conditions which had rendered him permanently and totally 
disabled in the 1981 Order of the Industrial Commission, as 
reinforced by additional impairment to plaintiff's knees resulting 
from the 1984 K-Mart injury and surgeries, not to mention the 
additional right wrist impairment and surgeries which took place 
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prior to the industrial incident of September 17. 1985, 
It is now well established Utah Compensation Law that it 
is within the sound discretion of the Industrial Commission to 
determine the commencement date of benefits for permanent total 
disability so long as the determination is supported by substantial 
evidence and not patently unreasonable. Oman v. Industrial 
Commission, 735 P.2d 665 (Utah App. 1987). See also Entwistle 
Company v. Wilkins. 626 P.2d 495. 498 (Utah 1981). (This Court will 
not overturn the factual findings of the Commission unless they 
arbitrary and capricious). It is also established Utah Compensation 
Law that a claimant for permanent total disability benefits must 
prove medically that his disability was caused by his industrial 
accident. See Large v. Industrial Commission. 758 P.2d 954 (Utah 
App. 1988). holding that where the permanent total disability is the 
result of pre-existing conditions and not the industrial accident, a 
claimant is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits from 
that industrial accident. See also Hodges v. Western Piling and 
Sheeting Company. 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986). In this case, the 
Commission found clearly that plaintiff's permanent total disability 
was the result of his pre-existing conditions and not his industrial 
accident of September 17, 1985. It is this defendants contention 
that the Commissions determination is well supported by substantial 
evidence in this case. Indeed, the evidence is overwhelming, if not 
conclusive. that plaintiff was clearly permanently and totally 
disabled prior to the time of his September 17. 1985 industrial 
incident. Reference to the permanent total disability determination 
by the Industrial Commission, through Administrative Law Judge, 
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Foley in 1981, supplemented by the clear cut medical report of Dr. 
Mendenhall referred to above (R.52)/ makes it clear that plaintiff 
indeed, was permanently and totally disabled as a result of his 
severe orthopedic problems as early as 1981. This total disability 
was further reinforced as a pre-existing condition by plaintiffs 
slip and fall injury with K-Mart in 1984 resulting in multiple 
surgeries and additional impairment and disability. Finally, there 
is undisputed evidence of substantial and significant increased 
right wrist problems and impairment beginning with plaintiff's right 
wrist fracture in 1954 and continuing right up to the date of his 
September 17, 1985, alleged industrial incident. A summary of 
plaintiff's right wrist history is as follows: 
(1) Right wrist fracture in 1954, at the age of 16 years 
which was treated in the State of Oklahoma. 
(2) On January 4, 1956, applicant sustained an industrial 
injury to his right wrist while employed by Western Union 
Services in the State of Oklahoma. Following this 
industrial accident, applicant underwent surgery on his 
right wrist, performed by Dr. John Ramsey in the State of 
Oklahoma. 
(3) In 1972, applicant was experiencing pain and 
discomfort into his right wrist. The applicant was 
treated by Dr. Kezerian for significant loss of motion in 
the right wrist. In addition, plaintiff was treated by 
Dr. Nathaniel Nord and Dr. Mark Greene. 
(4) On June 15, 1972, plaintiff was involved in a second 
industrial accident in the State of Utah involving his 
right wrist. It appears that he was employed by Strong 
Construction Company at the time of this right wrist 
injury. 
(5) In 1975, Dr. Eugene Chapman recommended to plaintiff 
that he undergo surgery on his right wrist. 
(6) Again, in 1976, Dr. Charles Smith indicated to 
plaintiff that the arthritis into the right wrist was 
increasing and that surgery was impossible method of 
treatment. 
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(7) In 1981. plaintiff sustained an injury to his right 
wrist at home. At that time, he injured his right wrist 
when he fell outside his bathtub. Following this 
incident, plaintiff was treated by Dr. Devon Nelson. In 
addition, in 1981. plaintiff underwent a fusion of the 
right wrist as performed by Dr. John P. Mendenhall. In 
1983. Dr. Mendenhall recommended that plaintiff undergo a 
fusion of the right wrist. On February 2, 1983. Dr. 
Mendenhall performed a carpal tunnel surgery on 
applicant's right wrist. 
(8) In 1984. Dr. Mendenhall treated plaintiff for a 
severe problem in the right wrist. At that time. Dr. 
Mendenhall advised plaintiff to undergo further surgery on 
his right wrist. 
It is apparent from the above that plaintiff's permanent 
total disability status began many years before the September. 1985 
alleged industrial incident and that not only did it continue 
following the Industrial Commission's permanent total disability 
Order of November. 1981 but it was indeed augmented by the serioqs 
knee injury of May. 1984 requiring two surgeries and indeed also by 
additional surgery and carpal tunnel surgery for plaintiff's right 
wrist. Thus, it is clear beyond reasonable question that 
plaintiff's permanent total disability status was not caused by his 
September 17. 1985. industrial incident but was in fact, totally due 
to injuries and conditions which preceded that industrial incident. 
Indeed, it appears from the full medical records that the incident 
of September. 1985 was not even a major contributor to plaintiff's 
right wrist problems which began at least 20 years ago and became 
increasingly more severe right up to the date of the injury now in 
controversy. 
It apparent from the above that the Commission's 
determination was supported by substantial-indeed 
overwhelming-evidence and therefore, was neither arbitrary. 
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capricious nor patently unreasonable. 
The Commission having made the proper factual 
determination that plaintiff's permanent total disability was caused 
by conditions and injuries pre-existing the September^ 1985 
industrial incident and not by the striking of his wrist on that 
1985 occasion, then applied, correctly and properly, the rationale 
of the Robert Large v. Industrial Commission, decision of this Court 
found in 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988). In that case, as here, the 
Commission found that the permanent total disability was the result 
of pre-existing conditions and not the industrial accident; 
therefore, the claimant was found not to be entitled to permanent 
total disability benefits from the later industrial accident. In 
the same vein is the Utah Supreme Court case of Hodges v. Western 
Piling and Sheeting Company. 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986). It is this 
defendant's position that the determination of the Commission in 
this instance, constitutes an a. fortiori application of the 
rationale of the Robert Large Opinion, because in this instance, 
plaintiff already has been found to be permanently and totally 
disabled as a result of multiple severe injuries and extensive 
surgeries of an orthopedic nature and, further, even following that 
permanent total disability determination had additional serious knee 
injuries and additional surgeries on plaintiff's right wrist prior 
to the September, 1985 alleged incident. All of the above combine 
to support even further the Commission's determination that 
plaintiff is not entitled to a permanent total disability finding 
resulting from his September, 1985 right wrist injury and further 
that his permanent total disability properly is attributable to the 
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pre-existing injuries and conditions which formed the basis for the 
initial permanent total disability award to plaintiff in 1981. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
1. Defendant's Motion for Review was timely filed and in 
compliance with the Utah Workers Compensation Act and particularly 
with the Industrial Commission Rule #R490-l-4, pertaining to the 
filing made in this instance. 
2. The Commission's factual determination that 
plaintiff's permanent total disability was caused by injuries and 
conditions pre-existing the industrial incident of September 17, 
1985 and not by that industrial injury is supported by substantial 
evidence in the record and, therefore, was not arbitrary, 
capricious, or unreasonable in the light of all the circumstances 
and the history of this case. Likewise, the Commission properly and 
correctly applied the rationale of the recent decision of this Court 
in the Robert Large v. Industrial Commission, supra, permanent total 
disability case. 
For the reasons set forth above, defendant Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund respectfully requests that plaintiff's appeal in 
this case be denied and the Order of the Industrial Commission 
affirmed. *rh 
Respectfully submitted this/tr . day of October, 1989. 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
:ie V. Baxrfman, Administrator 
— EXHIBIT I — 
954 Utah 758 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Robert C. LARGE, Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Howard Trucking of Utah, Inc., and/or 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah 
pnd the Second Injury Fund, Defend-
ants. 
No. 870437-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 3, 1988. 
Plaintiff was injured when applying 
for job and sought permanent total disabili-
ty benefits for his injury. The Industrial 
Commission denied him benefits, and plain-
tiff appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Greenwood, J., held that (1) finding that 
injury sustained while applying for job was 
not the medical cause of plaintiffs perma-
nent total disability status was supported 
by substantial evidence, and (2) claimant 
was not entitled to disability benefits, since 
his disability was the result of preexisting 
conditions and not an industrial accident 
Affirmed. 
1. Workers' Compensation «»6 
Proximate cause analysis primarily 
used in tort law and involving analysis of 
foreseeability, negligence and intervening 
causes, is not appropriate in workers' com-
pensation cases. 
2. Workers' Compensation <s»1533 
Finding that worker's back injury sus-
tained during job application process, upon 
stepping off truck, was not medical cause 
of worker's permanent total disability sta-
tus was supported by substantial evidence, 
which indicated that worker had sustained 
prior back injury, had difficulty walking 
due to obesity, and lacked transferable job 
skills. 
3. Workers' Compensation <3=»554 
Where a disability is the result of 
preexisting conditions and not an industrial 
accident, a claimant is not entitled to dis-
ability benefits. 
Jack C. Helgesen (argued), Helgesen & 
Waterfall, Ogden, for plaintiff. 
James R. Black (argued), Wendy B. 
Moseley, Black & Moore, Salt Lake City, 
for defendants. 
Barbara Elicerio, Legal Counsel, Indus-
trial Com'n, Salt Lake City, for Industrial 
Com'n of Utah. 
Before GREENWOOD, BILLINGS 
and DAVIDSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Robert C. Large appeals an Industrial 
Commission order which denied him perma-
nent total disability benefits. We affirm. 
On March 25, 1985, Large applied for a 
job as a truck driver with Howard Truck-
ing. For about two and one-half years 
before applying for the job, Large was 
self-employed. Prior to that time, he had 
been a truck driver for forty years. 
As part of the job application process, 
Large was required to take a driving test. 
He climbed into a truck but discovered the 
truck's clutch was not working properly. 
As Large stepped out of the truck, he 
slipped and fell on his back. At the time of 
the accident, Large was sixty-one years 
old, about six feet two and one-half inches 
tall and weighed 376 pounds. He was 
transported to Dixie Medical Center where 
X-rays were taken. The X-rays did not 
reveal a fracture, and the emergency room 
physician prescribed twenty-four hours bed 
rest Large drove to his home in Phoenix, 
Arizona the following day and made an 
appointment with Dr. Delbridge, an osteo-
pathic physician. Dr. Delbridge had seen 
Large six months earlier and had noted at 
that time that Large's past history included 
back problems. Dr. Delbridge examined 
Large and diagnosed his condition as acute 
lumbosacral sprain and arthritis and fibro-
sitis of the lumbosacral spine. Dr. Del-
bridge stated that Large had difficulty 
walking due to his weight and back injuries 
and that, in his opinion, Large was unem-
LARGE v. INDUSTR 
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ployable but might be trainable for work 
he could perform while sitting. In April 
1985, Dr. Ditchek examined Large and stat-
ed that "[rjeactive sclerosis is present and 
suggests that this may be of some age, but 
the possibility of new compression superim-
posed on old changes must be considered." 
In December 1985, Large saw Dr. Robert 
S. Barbosa who reported that Large's X-
rays revealed evidence of advanced arthro-
sis and a suggestion of a compression frac-
ture. Dr. Barbosa attributed 5% of 
Large's disability to his previous injury and 
5% to the present injury. Dr. Barbosa also 
recommended that Large undergo a CT 
scan to determine the extent of the frac-
ture and if it extended into the spinal canal. 
On April 22,1986, an Administrative Law 
Judge (A.LJ.) held a hearing on Large's 
application for temporary benefits. After 
the hearing, the A.LJ. wrote to Dr. Barbo-
sa and asked if the 10% permanent physical 
impairment was attributable to the March 
25, 1985 injury, if that injury aggravated 
Large's pre-existing condition and what 
percentage impairment rating he would as-
sign to Large's condition prior to March 25, 
1985. Dr. Barbosa responded, stating: 
At this point, to answer your 4 questions, 
I feel that the fall in March directly 
aggravated the patient's preexisting con-
dition, although, according to his testimo-
ny he was quite active. The patient also 
has a 10% permanent physical impair-
ment judging from his previous laminec-
tomy surgery which certainly contributes 
to what I feel is now a permanent physi-
cal impairment since the patient does 
have a less of strength, especially of the 
right lower extremity, rather severe dis-
comfort extending from the lumbar 
spine. I would give it approximately 5% 
due to the patient's previous lumbar sur-
gery, performed in 1953. This surgery 
was done for herniated lumbar disc. 
Based on this letter and the medical re-
ports submitted at the hearing, the A.L J. 
entered findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in September 1986 awarding Large 
temporary total disability benefits. Specifi-
cally, the A.LJ. found that some of Large's 
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impairment related to an earlier back inju-
ry Large sustained in 1953 and that further 
medical work was needed to determine the 
relationship between the present and the 
prior injury. The A.LJ. also stated that 
even though no Utah case addressed 
whether workers' compensation should cov-
er those injured during a "try-out" period, 
the statute should be construed liberally in 
favor of coverage. Neither party appealed 
the award of temporary total disability ben-
efits. 
In April 1987, Large requested perma-
nent total disability benefits. Attached to 
his request was a medical report prepared 
by Dr. David Plone. The report, based on 
an X-ray examination, noted moderate de-
generative changes throughout the lumbar 
spine, facet joint hypertrophy and arthritic 
disease. Further, the report stated, "There 
is compression of the superior vertebral 
body plate of L3, but this appears to be an 
old compression fracture." Without hold-
ing a further hearing, the A.LJ. entered 
supplemental findings and conclusions, 
stating that Large had a 10% disability, 5% 
attributable to the 1953 injury and 5% at-
tributable to the 1985 injury. The A.LJ. 
also stated that although Large was an 
employee for purposes of temporary total 
and permanent partial disability, he was 
not an employee for purposes of permanent 
total disability. The A.LJ. then found that 
Large's age, obesity, lack of transferrable 
skills and prior back surgery constituted 
the proximate or dominant cause of his 
disability. The A.LJ. concluded that Large 
was entitled to permanent partial disability 
benefits but not permanent total disability 
benefits because the proximate or domi-
nant cause of his unemployability was not 
the March 25, 1985 accident Large subse-
quently filed a motion for review, which 
the Industrial Commission denied. The 
Commission noted that the only issue on 
review was whether Large was entitled to 
permanent total disability benefits and 
agreed with the A.L J. that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-67 (1985)1 implies a causal connec-
tion between the injury and the permanent 
total disability. The Commission further 
1. This section governs procedures and payments for permanent total disability. 
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stated, "The concept of proximate cause 
serves the purpose of allowing those whose 
disabilities are truly the result of the indus-
trial injury to be properly compensated." 
This appeal followed. 
[1] On appeal, Large claims that the 
Commission erred in finding that factors 
other than the 1985 accident were the prox-
imate or dominant cause of his permanent 
total disability, and concluding, as a result 
of that finding, that he was not entitled to 
permanent total disability benefits. We 
agree that a "proximate cause" analysis, as 
that term is commonly used, is not appro-
priate in workers' compensation cases. 
Proximate cause is used primarily in tort 
law and involves analysis of foreseeability, 
negligence and intervening causes. These 
factors are not present in the statutory 
workers' compensation system, which ex-
cludes consideration of fault. A. Larson, 1 
Workmen's Compensation Law § 6.60 
(1985). 
Although proximate cause is not an ap-
propriate standard, the Utah Supreme 
Court has, nevertheless, required proof of 
a causal relationship as a prerequisite to 
awarding workers' compensation benefits. 
Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 
(Utah 1986). In Allen, the Utah Supreme 
Court interpreted Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-45 (1986)2, and explained that "by 
accident arising out of or in the course of 
employment" requires: (1) proof that the 
injury occurred "by accident"; and (2) 
proof of a causal connection between the 
accident and the activities or exertions re-
quired in the workplace. Id. at 18. In 
analyzing the causal connection, the Court 
adopted a two-part test which requires a 
claimant to establish legal cause and medi-
cal cause. Under the legal cause test "a 
claimant with a preexisting condition must 
show that the employment contributed 
something substantial to increase the risk 
he already faced in everyday life because 
of his condition." Id. at 27. Further, un-
der the medical cause test, the claimant 
must prove "the disability is medically the 
2. The statute provides that "Every employee . . . 
who is injured ... by accident arising out of or 
in the course of his employment . . . shall be 
result of an exertion or injury that oc-
curred during a work-related activity." Id. 
at 26. The standard of proof for causation 
is by a preponderance of the evidence. Id 
at 23. In Hodges v. Western Piling & 
Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986), the 
Court considered an Industrial Commission 
determination which awarded permanent 
partial disability benefits but denied perma-
nent total disability benefits to a sixty-
eight year old worker who injured his arm 
in an industrial accident The Court af-
firmed, finding that "[w]hile it is unques-
tioned that the medical panel found peti-
tioner to be one hundred percent physically 
impaired, the panel also found that the 
total impairment was due to the onset of 
severe arthritic problems." Id. at 721. 
The petitioner had a prior asymptomatic 
arthritic condition which flared up after the 
accident, but which was found to have no 
causal relationship to the industrial acci-
dent. Professor Larson has also observed 
that there is a distinction "between a pre-
existing disability that independently pro-
duces all or part of the final disability, and 
a pre-existing condition that in some way 
combines with or is acted upon by the 
industrial injury." A. Larson, 2 Work-
men's Compensation Law § 59.22(b) (1987). 
Therefore, a claimant for permanent total 
disability benefits must prove medically 
that his disability was caused by an indus-
trial accident 
[2] The critical inquiry in this case, 
therefore, is whether the Commission's de-
cision should be affirmed because Large 
did not prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the industrial accident was 
the medical cause of his disability. In re-
viewing the Industrial Commission's factu-
al findings, we will not disturb those find-
ings unless they are " 'arbitrary and capri-
cious,' or 'wholly without cause,' or 'con-
trary to the one [inevitable] conclusion 
from the evidence,' or 'without any sub-
stantial evidence to support them.'" Lan-
caster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d 237, 238 
(Utah 1987) (quoting Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
paid compensation for loss sustained on ac-
count of the injury " 
HEATON v. SECOND INJURY FUND 
Cite as 758 PJd 957 (UtahApp. 1988) 
Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1981)). isting injury.3 We disagree. 
Utah 957 
The medical reports in this case indicate 
that prior to the accident Large had back 
problems relating to a 1953 injury and her-
niated lumbar disc surgery. In addition, 
Dr. Delbridge's letter stated that Large 
had difficulty walking due to his weight 
and back injuries. Dr. Barbosa's medical 
report stated that Large's X-rays suggested 
a compression fracture but that a CT scan 
was required to determine the extent of the 
fracture. Subsequently, Dr. Plone stated 
that the compression fracture "appears to 
be an old compression fracture." Al-
though the Industrial Commission errone-
ously applied the proximate cause test rath-
er than the causation test articulated in 
Allen and Hodges, we find substantial evi-
dence in the record to support a finding 
that the 1985 injury was not the medical 
cause of Large's permanent total disability 
status and that Large's age, obesity, lack 
of transferable skills and prior back sur-
gery resulted in his disability. 
Large also asserts that the A.LJ. erred 
in finding that he was not an employee for 
purposes of permanent total disability ben-
efits. However, the A.LJ.'s findings of fact 
and conclusions of law and the Commis-
sion's denial of the motion for review are 
based on the inadequate causal link be-
tween the disability and the injury and not 
on Large's employee status. Therefore, 
the issue of whether Large was injured "in 
the course of his employment," while per-
forming "try-out" tasks, is not before us 
and is not addressed in this opinion. 
[3] Finally, Large claims that he is enti-
tled to permanent total disability benefits 
under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69 (1985) 
because the accident aggravated his pre-ex-
3. The version of section 35-1-69 which was in 
effect in 1985 when Large was injured stated: 
If any employee who has previously incurred 
a permanent incapacity by accidental injury 
. . . sustains an industrial injury for which 
either compensation or medical care, or both, 
is provided by this chapter that results in 
permanent incapacity which is substantially 
greater than he would have incurred if he had 
not had the pre-existing incapacity, or which 
aggravates or is aggravated by such pre-exist-
ing incapacity, compensation shall be award-
ed on the basis of the combined injuries, but 
the liability of the employer for such compen-
Section 35-1-
69 determines the apportionment of com-
pensation between the Second Injury Fund 
and the employer or its insurance carrier 
and does not address entitlement to perma-
nent total disability benefits. Entitlement 
to benefits is a prerequisite to considera-
tion of apportionment Where the disabili-
ty is the result of pre-existing conditions 
and not an industrial accident, a claimant is 
not entitled to disability benefits. 
Affirmed. 
BILLINGS and DAVIDSON, JJ., 
concur. 
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Injured worker petitioned for judicial 
review of decision of the Industrial Com-
mission that worker's permanent total dis-
ability benefit should commence only on 
date of medical confirmation of worker's 
disability. The Court of Appeals, Green-
wood, J., held that (1) Industrial Commis-
sation . . . shall be for the industrial injury 
only. The remainder shall be paid out of the 
Second Injury Fund 
The statute also provides that any aggravation 
of a pre-existing condition shall be deemed "sub-
stantially greater." Recently, section 35-1-69 
was repealed and reenacted. Under the current 
version of section 35-1-69, the test for appor-
tioning liability for compensation is not the 
"substantially greater" test Instead, the statute 
requires a 10% pre-existing whole person per-
manent impairment before liability for compen-
sation is apportioned. 
